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1  Introduction
Until recently, academic research about the European Parliament has neglected 
those who, uniquely in the institutional framework of the European Union, are 
elected directly: the Members of the European Parliament. Undoubtedly, the EP 
went through significant institutional developments since the first direct elec-
tion of 1979; it evolved from a “fig leaf” into a “co-legislature” (Corbett et  al. 
2011: p. 3). In the case of this constantly changing, expanding, and increasingly 
powerful institution, it has been the historic development of the European Par-
liament which captured academic curiosity. The Europe-wide direct election gen-
erated considerable attention from researchers as well, along with the topics of 
dynamics of party politics, inter-party competition, and party cohesion. Since the 
European Parliament’s role can only be understood as a part of the European 
institutional system, the fourth main pillar of scholarship on the EP was made up 
of analyses of its place within the European Union’s institutional matrix and its 
interrelationship with other EU bodies (Hix et al. 2002).
The starting point for this study is that no institution can be understood without 
focusing on the actors who fill the institution with content and formulate strategies 
for adaptation to formal and informal rules. From the second half of the 1990s, it was 
this realization which drove the authors of pioneering research on MEPs (Katz 1997; 
Scarrow 1997; Norris 1999; Wessels 1999), who have completed significant achieve-
ments in exploring topics such as career paths, parliamentary recruitment, and 
representatives’ perceptions of their own roles. The 21st century brought consider-
able progress in the examination of MEP voting behavior (Hix et al. 2007), intra-EP 
activity (McElroy 2006; Yordanova 2009), and the relationships between represent-
atives and parliamentary groups (Hix and Noury 2009). In the following pages, I 
will describe the role orientations of Central European MEPs, and this analysis will 
include their activities within and outside of the European Parliament.
In this study, I refer to those states from the Central European region which 
acceded to the European Union in 2004 as Central European countries. For the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia, it was not only the 
history of the previous decades – the decades of socialism and the subsequent 
democratic transition – which resulted in a similar context for the development 
of political elites, but also the first decade after the 2004 enlargement of the EU. 
These 10 years allow for enough time to assess how the Central European political 
elite became Europeanized (Semenova et al. 2014) on a new platform: the Euro-
pean Parliament. In terms of their political role orientations, which factors influ-
ence them most (Katz 1997; Farrell and Scully 2003; Navarro 2008), and how do 
these manifest themselves in their activities inside and outside the EP? I examine 
Central European MEPs in light of these questions. In all cases where attitudes of 
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MEPs were necessary for providing answers, I relied on data from questionnaires 
answered by the Central European legislators of the 2009–2014 term.
In terms of its genre, this article is a neo-institutionalist elite research. Con-
sequently, it places an emphasis on the effects of institutional frameworks on 
political behavior, but it also considers individual preferences (career plans, ideo-
logical positions, political experience) as significant factors. When developing the 
role typology used to identify dominant role perceptions, Strøm’s (1997) theory on 
politicians’ use of “scarce resources” served as an important influence. Along with 
his co-authors, Corbett et al. (2011: p. 64), who is an MEP himself, contended that 
“the main constraint on members is time.” Because of scarce resources, MEPs have 
to simultaneously determine their priorities when it comes to time spent on Euro-
pean and national policies and decide on what activities to focus on within the EP, 
in terms of their relationships with other EU institutions, and political and non-
political actors external to the EP. Due to concerns of re-election, it is impossible to 
completely ignore one’s relationship to national politics. On the other hand, from 
the perspective of a European career, it is similarly difficult to neglect the drive to 
gain prestige in Brussels and Strasbourg through the quality of the representative’s 
work, along with acquired tasks and positions. What strategic decisions a politician 
will make in these fields will be the result of individual deliberation. The same is 
true of the degree an MEP will make use of committee work to specialize in a given 
field. Should a parliamentarian be a generalist, or is it best to become an expert in 
a specific area? This, too, is a dilemma which requires legislators to make a choice.
In the first two parts I introduce the hypotheses of the study and the selected 
methodology, with special attention paid to a field research conducted through 
a questionnaire-based representative survey covering 40% of Central European 
MEPs in the 2009–2014 term. The third chapter identifies the fault lines along 
which politicians can be divided up, and this will serve as the basis for the devel-
opment of a new role typology. The fourth section introduces the factors which 
proved to be the most influential in shaping the role perceptions of the repre-
sentatives. The fifth chapter analyzes the link between activities and role orienta-
tions. Through the examination of officially documented activities in the EP and 
activities outside of it reconstructed through interviews with representatives, we 
can find out more about the connection between roles which manifest in coherent 
attitudinal structures and deeds.
2  Research Questions and Hypotheses
The research questions and the hypotheses of this paper are summarised in Table 1. 
Due to the lack of an “electoral connection,” a relationship with national politics 
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is of tremendous importance for MEPs (Hix and Høyland 2013). An MEP certainly 
has to pay attention in two directions, and from the perspective of his or her activi-
ties inside and outside the EP, picking to focus on either the national or European 
level may be a definitive choice. In lieu of “party government,” the outstanding 
role of committees is also known (Judge and Earnshaw 2008; Yordanova 2009). All 
MEPs are assigned into committees, and consequently the question of how much 
time and energy a politician should spend on policy work arises instantly. The 
answer to this, which is also an act of positioning oneself on the policy/politics 
spectrum, may determine the nature, direction, and genre of the activities of a 
representative. As a result, the European/national and policy/politics dimensions 
are staples for which, whether consciously or not, every MEP has to create some 
sort of an approach, and in turn these will affect their behavior in and outside of 
the EP. Therefore, my hypothesis is that the European/national and policy/politics 
dimensions are suitable to describe the political roles of Members of the European 
Table 1: Research Questions, Hypotheses and the Modes of Testing.
Research question   Hypothesis   Mode of testing
Can we distinguish various 
role orientations among 
Central European MEPs?
  Various role orientations 
can be distinguished among 
the Central European MEPs. 
European/national and 
policy/politics dimensions 
are applicable to describe 
the different roles of Central 
European MEPs (H1)
  Factor analysis and further 
two-variable analyses based 
on responses by Central 
European MEPs (and cluster 
analysis for grouping)
Are there differences 
between the role 
orientations of Central 
European MEPs in terms of 
their activities within the 
European Parliament?
  There are differences 
between the different political 
roles in terms of activities in 
the EP (H2). (Policy/politics 
approaches are identifiable 
in the activities of Central 
European representatives 
within the EP)
  Correlations between the 
roles of politicians and their 
activities within the EP
Are there differences 
between the role 
orientations of Central 
European MEPs in terms of 
their activities outside of 
the European Parliament?
  There are differences 
between the different 
political roles in terms of 
activities outside of the EP 
(H3). (European/national 
approaches are identifiable 
in the activities of Central 
European representatives 
outside of the EP)
  Correlations between the 
roles of politicians and their 
activities outside of the EP
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 Parliament (H1). I will examine the validity of this statement amongst Central 
European MEPs, attempt to establish a possible role typology and examine which 
variables best explain the role orientations of these politicians.
In two further hypotheses, I will treat the roles of MEPs as independent vari-
ables. I will discuss separately how the manifestations of roles inside and outside 
the EP affect behavior. In the former case, I assert that the policy/politics dimen-
sion of political roles is clearly visible in the activities MEPs choose in the EP (H2). 
However, the activities of an MEP are naturally not restricted to intra-EP work. 
Keeping in touch with other institutions, national politics, the domestic press, 
advocacy groups and citizens are also equally important. For this reason, I will 
also examine the hypothesis that role perceptions of MEPs can be demonstrated 
in activities outside of the EP (H3).
3  The Database
Several conclusions of this study are based on field research and the resultant 
database (Table 2). Without data from Central European MEPs, it would have 
been impossible to make substantive claims about their ideas of representation, 
political roles and activities outside of the EP. During two different periods, I 
have spent a total of 4 weeks – between 5–16 September 2011 and 25 June-6 July 
2012 – conducting in-person questionnaire interviews with MEPs from the Czech 
Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia and Slovenia. Most of the questionnaire 
was adopted from the questions of the European Parliamentary Research Group’s 
2010 MEP survey (Farrell et al. 2011), and these were transplanted verbatim to 
increase comparability in the future. However, I also added some questions of my 
own to the questionnaire. Additional individual research was necessary due to 
the 2010 EPRG survey’s low sample size among Central European legislators. For 
example, reaching Hungarian representatives proved to be especially ineffective 
in the EPRG 2010 research: EPRG was only able to include four MEPs out of a total 
of 22. In the end, the two surveys complemented each other well: both projects 
reached MEPs which the other did not, or did so to a much lesser degree.
During the creation of the final database, I assessed the effectiveness of both 
researches for inclusion. In both instances, I chose to utilize data from the research 
project which was able to reach more MEPs from a given party.1 Where access rates 
1 My research included 33 interviews in Brussels and Strasbourg. After employing the effective-
ness-based selection mechanism for each party, 26 data sets made it into the final database. I 
expanded this by making use of responses provided by 19 representatives (2/3 of whom were 
Polish) from EPRG’s 2010 survey.
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Table 2: MEPs According to Member States and Parliamentary Groups Among all Central Euro-
pean MEPs and those Included in the Survey Research (2009–2014 EP term).
Country   EP parliamentary 
group
  All Central 
European MEPs
  Number of MEPs 
in sample
  Data 
source
Czech Republic   ECR   9   3  ABN
  S&D   7   4  EPRG
  GUE/NGL   4   2  ABN
  EPP   2   1  EPRG
Hungary   EPP   14   5  ABN
  S&D   4   4  ABN
  Independent   3   3  ABN
  ECR   1   –  –
Poland   EPP   28   9  EPRG
  ECR   15   2  EPRG
  S&D   7   1  EPRG
Slovakia   EPP   6   4  3 ABN+1 
EPRG
  S&D   5   1  ABN
  ALDE   1   1  EPRG
  EFD   1   –  –
Slovenia   EPP   3   2  ABN
  S&D   2   2  ABN
  ALDE   2   1  ABN
Central Europe   All parliamentary 
groups
  114   45 
ABN, András Bíró-Nagy’s 2011–2012 research; EPRG, European Parliamentary Research Group’s 
2010 research. The number of each parliamentary group’s members reflects the initial situation 
of the 2009–2014 term. During the term, the Polish and Slovenian delegations gained one 
European People’s Party MEP each.
were identical, I used my own data, because my survey included further control 
questions. As a result, I was able to assemble a database which included 40% of 
all Central European MEPs (45 responders), which, when compared to other EP 
survey research projects, is a good ratio.2
By combining the relevant parts of both databases, the result was a final data-
base which offers relatively representative results according to political groups 
2 Julien Navarro’s role typology (2008) was completed by interviewing a little over 10% of MEPs. 
The EPRG’s 2010 survey officially reached 36.8% (270 responders), but if we consider the num-
ber of those who completed the questionnaire substantively, their access rate was considerably 
weaker. The left/right or European integrational scales, for example, were only addressed by 
24% of all legislators (Scully et al. 2012: p. 675).
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and member states. This study is mostly based on these new empirical results.3 It 
is important to add that both surveys attempted complete coverage. Through mul-
tiple rounds of emails, EPRG contacted all MEPs, while I addressed all representa-
tives from the five Central European countries surveyed. The response rate can be 
seen even more favorably when we view only those MEPs who are actually active 
within the EP. If we only consider MEPs who have participated in at least 85% of 
all votes, then coverage immediately jumps to 68%.
In the database of Central European MEPs, only the European Conserva-
tives and Reformists (ECR) group and the Polish delegation could be considered 
as somewhat underrepresented. The main reason for this is that willingness 
to respond among Law and Justice (PiS) MEPs was rather meager. Because PiS 
started the 2009–2014 cycle with the second largest number of MEPs in the region, 
it is legitimately presumable that if their willingness to respond would have been 
more prominent, the regional average would have been shifted further to the right 
and more towards the support of national sovereignty.
The Eurosceptic ECR’s generally rejective attitude was not limited to Central 
European MEPs: ECR was the most underrepresented group in the EPRG 2010 
database as well. In terms of political power relations, however, it is much 
more significant that in the Central European database representativeness for 
the European People’s Party (EPP), the largest faction, is identical among the 
total number of representatives and of those included in the sample, while 
there is also no significant deviation between the radical left-wing (GUE/NGL) 
and liberal (ALDE) groups (Table 3). Members of the socialist group (S&D) 
Table 3: Distribution of all Central European MEPs According to Political Groups Among all 
Central European MEPs and MEPs Included in the Survey (%).
EP political group   Ratio among all Central 
European MEPs
  Ratio in 
sample
EPP   46.5   46.7
S&D   21.9   26.7
ECR   21.9   11.1
GUE/NGL   3.5   4.4
ALDE   2.6   4.4
EFD   0.9   0
Independent   2.6   6.7
Numbers reflect the initial situation of the 2009–2014 EP term.
3 I gathered data about the activities of MEPs within the EP from Votewatch’s database.
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are also only slightly overrepresented, while the weight of independent MEPs 
(practically speaking, the legislators from Hungarian far-right Jobbik) is some-
what higher within the sample pool since all three of them chose to reply to the 
questionnaire.
In terms of member state representativeness, due to the relative under-
representation of Polish MEPs (26.7% of the sample is Polish, while their 
ratio among the total number of MEPs is 43.9%), the weight of other Central 
European countries increased slightly. Nonetheless, the Poles (tying with the 
Hungarians) provided the largest number of representatives for the sample. 
The favorable ratio for reaching Hungarian and Slovenian MEPs – over 50% –  
resulted in slight overrepresentation, while to a lesser degree this is also true 
for Czech and Slovak legislators, for whom the same indicator was 45%. With 
the exception of the Polish delegation, however, these deviations did not upset 
the natural proportions resulting from differences in size. Slovenians are 
present in the sample with the fewest MEPs, and are followed by the Slovaks 
and the Czechs.
4  The Roles of Central European MEPs
One of the characteristics of neo-institutional role research, despite varying 
approaches, is that the exploration of roles uses the attitudes of representatives 
as a starting point (Searing 1994; Strøm 1997; Navarro 2008; Blomgren and Rozen-
berg 2012). What is of decisive importance for sketching out the strategies of poli-
ticians, is how representatives view themselves. I followed this principle when 
using the results of the survey of Central European MEPs about the perceptions of 
their political roles for analysis. The original EPRG survey gave a separate block 
of questions for attitudes related to representation. This featured questions on 
the direction and content of representation, as well as its (geographical) focus. 
Furthermore, questions which examined embeddedness into the EU’s institu-
tional system were also important. The direction of interest and attention may be 
revealed from this data, too.
I approached the theme of representation through the use of several ques-
tions during the research. I got to the examination of role types through an estab-
lished two-part methodological maneuver. First, I attempted data condensation 
and the exploration of the correlations with the data structure and variables 
through factor analysis. After identifying the components which did not corre-
late with each other, as the second step of my analysis strategy, I used cluster 
analysis to organize the 45 Central European MEPs in the sample into relatively 
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homogenous groups. I conducted the cluster analysis with variables obtained 
from the factor analysis.4
Of the six variables, two cover the direction of representation in terms of its 
content and genre, two are concerned with the (geographical) focus of represen-
tation, and two probe the strength of MEPs’ relationships with the EU’s execu-
tive, the European Commission. Including a question on legislative work was of 
fundamental importance. Not only did Central European MEPs believe this was 
the most important aspect of their work (4.37 on a five-point scale), but it is simul-
taneously a great indicator for the openness towards policy work, regardless of 
whether the focus of that work is on the European or national level. The inclusion 
of attitudes towards “developing common strategies for EU policies” is justified 
by our gaining valuable information on interest in European matters. Questions 
examining the geographical focus of representation are also crucial, specifically 
because they aim to establish whether sharply distinguishable “national” and 
“European” attitudinal structures exist. The two questions pertaining to this 
topic assessed how important it was for MEPs to represent all people in Europe, 
or whether they kept the interests of their own countries’ constituents in mind. 
The two questions on MEPs’ relationships with the European Commission were 
gauged towards measuring the degree of policy-orientation once again, albeit 
this time in an indirect manner. A close relationship with Commission officials, 
who are sealed off from political work and expression, is a clear sign of an MEP’s 
strong interest in a given field of policy. Such relationships would illustrate what 
an MEP would like to affect and find out more about the processes of public policy. 
Keeping in contact with commissioners already creates the possibility of a coop-
eration more political in its nature, but the strictly demarcated portfolios and the 
stipulation that EU commissioners cannot intervene in the domestic politics of 
member states take the nature of relationships with MEPs in a policy-oriented 
direction. Consequently, these variables are very appropriate for measuring the 
degree to which an MEP considers the policy dimension of his or her work to be 
important.
Based on the data from the factor analysis contained in Table 4, we can con-
clude that MEPs’ responses signal a coherent attitudinal structure. The analy-
sis shows that two different dimensions exist which correlate with each other. 
4 It is a basic methodological requirement in factor analysis for the sample size to be at least 
five, but possibly ten times larger than the number of examined variables. Keeping this in mind, 
it was only possible to introduce a limited number of variables into the factor analysis. In the end 
I examined six variables which intended to grasp representatives’ self-assumed roles from vari-
ous directions. As such, the sample size is 7.5 times the number of the examined variables, which 
fulfills the methodological criteria. 
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The factor analysis – conducted in the exploratory mode according to the Kaiser 
criterion – indicates that two components were formed from the six variables, 
and these explain 66.55% of the complete variance.
The variables about which it was possible to suppose that they measure affin-
ity towards either policy or politics, clearly belonged to the first component. On 
the other hand, out of the variables which operationalized the focus of repre-
sentation, the data relating to the representation of all people in Europe and the 
opinions on common European strategies formed a new dimension. Based on 
factor weights, the fit of variables is very convincing: only the fit of the focus on 
the citizens of an MEP’s own country is questionable. This latter variable is some-
what less connected to both components.
Though European orientation can clearly be separated from the dimension 
of representative activities, responses pertaining to the representation of fellow 
countrymen did not make the interpretation of factors any easier. However, we 
must note that the indicator used in the EPRG research, in reality, did not measure 
the polarization of responders along the line of national advocacy. Those who 
believed the representation of all European citizens to be extremely important 
(and awarded the maximum score on a five-point scale) obviously thought that 
Table 4: Rotated Factor Matrix (n = 45).*,a
  Component
  1: Explained 
variance 39.76%
  2: Explained 
variance 26.79%
Working on legislation   –0.738   0.170
Developing common strategies for EU policies   –0.253   0.756
Representation – all people in Europe   –0.216   0.829
Representation – all people in my member state   –0.444   –0.494
Relationship with officials in the Commission   0.901   –0.267
Relationship with European Commissioners   0.849   –0.062
*KMO = 0.55 (p < 0.000); Run based on a PCA extraction method with the use of Varimax rotation. 
Bold values indicate the relationship between the variables and the components.
aVariables used – The original question in the case of “Working on legislation” and “Develop-
ing common strategies” for EU policies was: When thinking about your work as an MEP, how 
important are the following aspects of your work? (on a scale of 1–5). The original question for 
the representation of “all people in Europe” and “all people in my member state” was: How 
important is it to you to represent the following groups of people in the European Parliament? 
(on a scale of 1–5). The original question on the relationship with officials in the Commission 
and European Commissioners was: How frequently are you in contact with the following groups, 
people, or institutions? (on a scale of 1–6).
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their countrymen’s representation was also essential (on average, they allowed 
for a score of 4.19), because their fellow nationals are also EU residents. As such, 
to see how responders approach national advocacy and whether this is independ-
ent of representative activity, it was worthwhile to supplement the EPRG survey 
with more confrontational questions.
On one hand, I added to the elements testing the direction of representation 
a reply option for “standing up for national interest,” the importance of which 
could be indicated, similarly to previous responses, on a five-point scale.5 Fifteen 
of the 25 Central European MEPs responding to the question on the protection of 
national interests thought it deserved the maximum score on a five-point scale, 
which shows that we have discovered an important and previously less-empha-
sized consideration. During comparison with the two components from the factor 
analysis, it was revealed that “standing up for the national interest” can only 
really become interpretable within the national/European dimension (Table 5), 
while it shows no connection to the policy/politics axis.
Table 5: The Connection Between the Protection of National Interests and the Components of 
the Factor Analysis (n = 25).*
Standing up for 
national interest**
  “Policy/politics” 
dimension (factor values)
  “National/European” 
dimension (factor values)
0
 Average   –0.10   0.41
 Sample size   10   10
 Variance   0.86   0.46
1
 Average   0.25   –0.76
 Sample size   15   15
 Variance   1.55   1.30
Source: Own calculations.
*The correlation with policy-related activity: η2 = 0.03 (p = 0.453); the connection with national/
European representation: η2 = 0.27 (p = 0.008).
**Description of variable: 1 = those who thought that standing up for national interest to be 
extremely important and gave it a score of 5 on a five-point scale.
5 Because additional questions were only included in my questionnaire, these variables are only 
available for a group that is smaller than the complete Central European sample. As a result, they 
could not be included in the factor analysis, though they are perfectly suitable for the further 
testing of components gained from the factor analysis.
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On the other hand, I added to the original questionnaire a question about 
which parliamentary activity suits the MEP in question the most. Highlighting 
plenary speeches from possible responses clearly indicated dedication towards 
political activities, while emphasizing the role of the rapporteur, the most prestig-
ious policy role in the EP, was a good indicator of a policy-oriented approach. The 
preference for the tasks of a rapporteur and plenary speeches showed an impor-
tant correlation with the first, policy/politics dimension as well. These additional 
questions reaffirmed the results of the factor analysis in terms of content: the 
two distinguishable components are really the fault lines of “policy/politics” and 
“European/national.” As such, the factor analysis and the two-variable test prove 
that the role perception of Central European MEPs cannot be assessed based on 
a single dimension. Both policy/politics activities and the focus of geographical 
representation have independent significances.
Based on the poles of the two dimensions, four ideals of role perceptions 
emerge. In relation to these, firstly I am interested in where Central European 
MEPs are located in the space stretching between these two dimensions. Sec-
ondly, I create homogenous groups based on these two parameters which are sub-
stantially different and will serve as a good basis for further multivariate analysis.
Cluster analyses are very sensitive to deviant or salient data. Because these 
are not part of the basic population, they distort the real structure. For this 
reason, in the first round I removed, after hierarchical clustering, six MEPs who 
clearly stood out from the rest. In the second phase, I placed them in the relevant 
clusters, because they really were the most typical examples of a given role type. 
With the reintroduction of the outliers, the final distribution was born (Figure 1). 
According to this, the largest group of MEPs in the sample are the ones whose 
work has a European focus and is policy-related in its nature – out of the 45 
MEPs, 17 fit into this category. The second most populous group of 13 legislators 
included those who are closer to matters of policy, but the focus of their work is 
national. The third group consisting of 11 members had a European focus, and 
they are mostly comfortable with political topics and tasks. The last assemblage 
of four parliamentarians, is made up of those who have a national focus and pri-
oritize political debates vis-à-vis policy work.
Those whose professional lives are characterized by EU-level policy work and 
placing EU public policy at the top of the agenda belong to the category of EU Pol-
icy-makers. When an EU Policy-maker takes up a cause, whether the item allows 
for advocating for national interest or not is not a definitive factor.
The tools used by a National Policy-maker are identical to those espoused 
by EU Policy-makers, but the focus of their work is completely different. In the 
European Parliament, a National Policy-maker is a person whose main goal is 
the achievement of changes favorable to his or her home country. They are also 
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Figure 1: Central European MEPs According to their Role Types (n = 45).
dominantly oriented towards policy work, but the benchmark of their success is a 
tangible public policy benefit for their native land.
An EU Politician is one who looks at solving the challenges facing the Euro-
pean Union as a political entity as the centerpiece of his or her agenda. When it 
comes to enforcing interests, the basis for action is not the national but a general-
ist worldview and system of values. Politics-related matters fit the political profile 
of this category best, as opposed to topics of public policy.
The National Politician prioritizes issues which have become, for one reason 
or another, decisive political issues in his or her state. Those who regard the pro-
motion of national interests as their top priority emphasize matters of politics 
where championing such interests is one of their countries’ strategic political 
goals.
Looking at the distribution of role types, it is visible that those who focus on 
the European level outnumber the nationally-oriented Central European MEPs 28 
to 17. The policy/politics fault line features 30 MEPs on its policy side and 15 who 
are geared more towards politics. From the specific placement of MEPs on Figure 1, 
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it can be seen that pure roles are rare amongst the politicians in the sample pool. 
It is much more important to stress that we are talking about dominant and not 
exclusive roles. The diagram shows which fields are the most prominent for 
specific representatives based on their own responses and self-categorizations. 
However, this does not mean that, depending on the situation, they do not try 
other roles as well (Bíró-Nagy 2010). No MEP conducts only one type of work, and 
no one is excluded from other roles by the demarcation of dominant roles. It is 
easily fathomable that an MEP builds a strong profile as an EU Policy-maker, but 
simultaneously and frequently weighs in on matters of domestic politics in his or 
her home country. Parallels within the roles are not to be regarded as a confusion 
of roles which negate each other. Instead, they show the possibilities offered by 
being an MEP and show the potential diversity of life in Brussels and Strasbourg.
When we break the data down by countries, the situation of Czech MEPs is 
balanced in both the European/national and policy/politics dimensions. In both 
regards, the ratio is 5 to 5 out of a total of 10 legislators. The two most frequent 
roles among them are EU Politician and National Policy-maker.
Hungarian MEPs are also divided fairly equally by the two axes. In both cases 
the ratio is 7 to 5, with the European and policy-oriented fields being slightly more 
populous. All four typologies have Hungarian adherents. The most frequent cat-
egory among Hungarians is the EU Policy-maker.
Only policy-oriented Polish representatives made it into the sample pool, 
with 5 National Policy-makers and 7 EU Policy-makers. It is worthwhile to 
mention here, too, that if Eurosceptic MEPs would have shown more willingness 
to respond, the National Policy-maker category would have most likely been even 
larger, and there could have been Polish legislators among the National Politi-
cians as well.
There was only one Slovenian MEP whose focus was national, while the 
remaining four were geared more towards the direction of Europe. The ratio along 
the policy/politics axis was 3 to 2, with a slight majority in the latter category. The 
most common Slovenian typology was the EU Politician with three out of the total 
of five Slovenian MEPs belonging to that category.
The majority of Slovak parliamentarians had a European focus (5 to 1) and 
preferred policy-making (4 to 2). Out of the six Slovak legislators in the sample 
pool, three were EU Policy-makers and two were EU Politicians.
Regarding a breakdown based on European political groups, there is a notable 
difference between mainstream and less influential, non-mainstream representa-
tives (Table 6). Two-thirds of Central European MEPs at the European People’s 
Party and 80% of S&D politicians had a European focus in the period between 
2009 and 2014. Of the 33 legislators from the two largest families of parties, only 
one – a member of Hungary’s governing party Fidesz – was a National Politician. 
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 26.04.16 11:19
Central European MEPs and Their Roles      15
As such, those who work in the largest political groups are usually open to policy 
work. In the EPP, the EU Policy-maker is the dominant typology – 10 of 21 MEPs 
belong to this category. In the social-democratic (S&D) faction, the EU Politician 
and the EU Policy-maker proved to be equally popular roles.
Nationally focused roles are characteristic of parliamentary factions outside 
of the EP’s mainstream parties. The Central European MEPs sitting with the 
European Conservatives and Reformists included only a single European Pol-
icy-maker, while an additional four colleagues were National Policy-makers or 
National Politicians. The Czech lawmakers in the radical leftist GUE-NGL group 
represent a certain type of “national communism”: both of their representatives 
included in the sample pool were National Policy-makers. Two of the three inde-
pendent Jobbik MEPs have adopted the profile of a National Politician, while their 
third peer emphasized the role of an EU Policy-maker, especially in questions of 
industry and energy.
Navarro (2012) calls attention to the notion that political experience, institu-
tional learning and changing career goals can result in changes for MEPs’ roles. 
Someone who enjoyed plenary debates during one period of his or her term in 
office may become a specialist in another. The converse, naturally, can also be 
true, and crossing or switching over to further roles may also be possible. The role 
types determined at a given moment and the categorizations of MEPs may only 
Table 6: Role Orientations of Central European MEPs According to European Political Groups 
(n = 45).
Role orientations   EP political group   Total
  EPP   S&D   ALDE   ECR   GUE-NGL   Independent  
National Politicians              
 Number of MEPs   1   0   0   1   0   2   4
 % within parliamentary faction   4.8   0.0   0.0   20.0   0.0   66.7   8.9
EU Politicians              
 Number of MEPs   4   5   2   0   0   0   11
 % within parliamentary faction   19.0   41.7   100.0   0.0   0.0   0.0   24.4
National Policy-maker              
 Number of MEPs   6   2   0   3   2   0   13
 % within parliamentary faction   28.6   16.7   0.0   60.0   100.0   0.0   28.9
EU Policy-maker              
 Number of MEPs   10   5   0   1   0   1   17
 % within parliamentary faction   47.6   41.7   0.0   20.0   0.0   33.3   37.8
Total              
 Number of MEPs   21   12   2   5   2   3   45
Source: Own calculations.
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provide us with a snapshot which, at a later date, may change along with par-
liamentarians’ role perceptions. Of course, this line of thought is true for all role 
research, just as much as it is for the categorization introduced above.
5   Variables Affecting the Roles of Central 
European MEPs
When looking at Table 7, we can see which of the simultaneously displayed inde-
pendent variables (sociodemographic background, political experience, atti-
tudes, party affiliation, electoral systems, and career ambitions) best indicated 
the position of an MEP on the European/national and policy/politics axes. It is 
not only important to rank the ten variables according to their influence, but it is 
also practical to draw a line between relevant and less weighty factors.
Based on the model, classification according to a European or national focus 
is mostly affected by four factors. The two strongest correlations in this case are 
age and political group. MEPs older than the average (over the age of 49) and 
belonging to the two largest factions (European People’s Party and Socialists 
& Democrats) are very likely to orient themselves towards the European Union. 
Younger and smaller European parties’ representatives tend to have a stronger 
national focus.
A slightly less significant factor than these latter two which is nonetheless 
relevant is the time spent in the EP. Those starting the 2009–2014 term as incum-
bents are more likely to be drawn in the national direction, while fresh arrivals to 
the EP are dominated by a European focus. This suggests that in the second term 
after accession, the typical MEP arriving to the institution had a European repre-
sentative focus. It is also possible – although untestable without more detailed 
data – that new arrivals are more idealistic and enthusiastic about EU politics, 
and this could be mirrored numerically. Ideological positions, that is to say self-
identification on the left/right spectrum, is also noteworthy. Central European 
MEPs positioning themselves on the left tended to bolster the camp of those 
focusing on the European level, while right-wingers were more likely to support 
a national focus. According to the variables which demonstrated the strongest 
correlation, the stereotype of the Central European MEP with a European focus 
would be best exhausted by an S&D member over 50 who was a novice in 2009.
When it comes to the policy/politics axis, previous political experience and 
future career ambitions are definitive. Experience in local politics tends to signal 
a more generalist political role perception, while its lack strengthens the prob-
ability of a profile open to policy work. The reason for this might be that in local 
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Table 7: Logit Models Estimating Politicians’ Roles, n = 44.
Independent variables**   European focus*   Politics focus*
  p-Value   Exp(B)   p-Value   Exp(B)
Sex   0.257   4.154   0.887   0.834
Age   0.045   54.551   0.405   3.631
Experience in government   0.323   4.510   0.749   0.640
Experience in local politics   0.779   0.691   0.066   12.162
Future political ambition   0.578   2.104   0.106   6.112
Political group   0.041   44.840   0.857   0.815
Support for European integration   0.461   0.302   0.998   1.000
Left-right self-identification   0.130   10.990   0.998   1.000
Electoral system   0.265   0.120   0.588   0.512
First term in office – not an Incumbent  0.064   14.794   0.121   5.187
Nagelkerke R2   0.62   0.61
Hit rate in null model   60.50%   67.40%
Ratio of correctly predicted cases   88.40%   83.70%
Source: Own calculations.
*Description of dependent variables: All dummies are variables. European focus: 1 = MEPs clas-
sified as having a European focus according to the factor and cluster analyses; Politics focus: 
1 = MEPs classified as Politicians by the factor and cluster analyses. Shaded areas indicate 
those independent variables that explain the dependent variables the most.
**Description of independent variables: For an easier comparison of odd ratios, all variables 
are dummies: sex: 1 = male, age: 1 = over 49 (the relevant date is 2009); experience in govern-
ment: 1 = has experience; experience in local politics: 1 = has experience (mayor, local govern-
ment representative, member of regional government); future political ambitions: 1 = would 
like to remain in the EP in 10 years, 0 = did not choose this option; political group: 1 = member 
of EPP or S&D; pro-European integration: in comparison with the sample average, MEP is more 
dedicated to deepening integration (marked at least 7 on a scale of 1–10); left-right self-iden-
tification: classified him/herself as more left-wing (on a scale of 1–10, where 1 indicates the 
most left-wing position, MEP marked him/herself as a 5 at most); electoral system: 1 = ran in a 
preferential voting system, 0 = got in on a closed list; first term in office: 1 = was not an MEP prior 
to 2009.
politics (in the case of MEPs, characteristically in positions such as mayors or 
leaders of regional government) there is less of a need to specialize in a specific 
area of policy than as a former member of a national parliament or, especially, the 
executive. The more generalist approach of local politics goes hand in hand with 
the avoidance of policy-centered roles in the EP. We should add that the nature of 
the electoral system in the model shows a significant overlap with having experi-
ence in local politics. 13 of the 15 MEPs with experience in local politics got into 
the EP through preferential voting lists. If we did not know data on prior careers, 
the significance of the electoral system would be greater in the model.
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The MEPs who see themselves in the legislative body in the long term are 
more likely to be Politicians than Policy-makers. Returning to national legisla-
tures was not an appealing prospect for either group, but Policy-makers felt that 
becoming a member of a national executive was a much more appealing venture.
It is useful to mention the importance of time spent within the institution 
in the case of the Politician/Policy-maker split. Incumbents were represented in 
greater numbers among Policy-makers. Based on the data, it cannot be decided 
if this is the result of the learning process within the EP or if the ones who stayed 
for another term after the 2004–2009 cycle were those who adopted the profile 
of a Policy-maker. In either case, MEPs who started their second term in 2009 
were characteristically more favorably inclined towards policy than newcomers. 
According to the three most strongly correlating variables, the Central European 
generalist Politician is a first-timer MEP coming from local politics who envisions 
him or herself remaining in the newly acquired office even after 10 years.
On the whole, it can be said of the models based on the European/national 
and policy/politics axes that they help forecasting the roles of MEPs. Time spent 
in the EP, age, previous political experience, European political group and career 
ambitions are extraordinarily important information if we would like to determine 
a parliamentarian’s dominant role perception. Categorization is further advanced 
by knowing the position on the left-right spectrum. As such, socio-demographic 
factors, attitudes and political socialization together influence the formation of 
roles. If we are familiar with these parameters, we are likely to be able to predict 
which dominant role an MEP will adopt.
It is important to emphasize that identifying variables which provide expla-
nations reinforces previous results: it is actually important to distinguish Euro-
pean/national and policy/politics dimensions. Further evidence of this is that 
different variables explain the position occupied in these two dimensions, apart 
from the incumbency variable which has substantial explanatory power in both 
cases. In conclusion, what was proven is that the European/national and policy/
politics dimensions have different roots.
6   The Roles of Central European MEPs and their 
Activities
In addition to what determinants influence the role orientations of Central Euro-
pean MEPs, it is useful to review the relationship that exists between various roles 
and the work of legislators, because the roles are, naturally, not only made of 
attitudes but also of behavioral characteristics. The activities of parliamentarians 
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must be split into two parts: officially documented activities inside the European 
Parliament and all other work conducted outside of the institution.
6.1   The Roles of Central European MEPs and their Activities in 
the EP
Orientation towards politics or policy is very visible when we look at what par-
liamentary activities MEPs spend their energy on (Table 8). In the three pol-
icy-related parliamentary genres (being a rapporteur, drafting opinions and 
submitting amendments) both the National Policy-Makers and EU Policy-makers 
of the 2009–2014 term were much more active than National Politicians and EU 
Politicians. A Central European MEP who has a Policy-maker profile generally 
received four rapporteur assignments during the 2009–2014 term, while the same 
indicator was less than two among those who were classified as having the role 
perception of a Politician. Among National Politicians, there was only one leg-
islator who applied for such a task and actually succeeded in receiving it, too. 
The large gap between the two profiles is also apparent when we look at drafting 
opinions. During the examined period, the average for Central European MEPs in 
this field was 2.5, with Policy-makers having more experience in this realm and 
Politicians underperforming. EU Policy-makers were also ahead of the curve in 
amendments. With an average of 70 amendments, they outperformed National 
Politicians by a 3.5 multiplier, but they appreciably surpassed EU Politicians and 
National Policy-makers, too.
In the field of politics-type activities (plenary speeches, motions for reso-
lutions, parliamentary questions, and written declarations), it can be deduced 
that Policy-makers are not less active than Politicians. National Policy-makers 
are especially active in supporting motions for resolutions which tend to bear 
symbolic relevance, and in posing parliamentary questions. The latter are very 
important, because they are the main MEP-level manifestations of the oversight 
function over the Commission and the Council. Consequently, they are great tools 
for National Policy-makers for proving to public opinion and their parties that 
they will indeed check up on EU institutions in matters which are relevant in 
terms of the national interests of their own countries. At the same time, EU Policy-
makers are the most active in plenary speeches, which signals a type of general 
hyperactivity, and, concomitantly, that they are not narrowing their foci only on 
policy tools but making use of all available genres.
Concerning concrete numbers, Central European MEPs who have a Politi-
cian profile are not more active in politics-type activities than Policy-makers, but 
within their own activities these actions have a bigger role. While the activities of 
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 26.04.16 11:19
20      András Bíró-Nagy
Ta
bl
e 8
: 
Th
e A
ct
ivi
tie
s o
f C
en
tra
l E
ur
op
ea
n 
M
EP
s i
n 
th
e E
ur
op
ea
n 
Pa
rli
am
en
t A
cc
or
di
ng
 to
 R
ol
e t
yp
es
, 2
00
9–
20
14
.
 
Pl
en
ar
y 
sp
ee
ch
es
 M
ot
io
ns
 fo
r 
re
so
lu
tio
ns
 P
ar
lia
m
en
ta
ry
 
qu
es
tio
ns
 
W
rit
te
n 
de
cla
ra
tio
ns
 R
ep
or
ts
 O
pi
ni
on
s
 A
m
en
dm
en
ts
Na
tio
na
l P
ol
iti
cia
n
 
13
4.
25
 
1.
25
 
14
.2
5
 
0*
 
0.
25
 
0.
25
**
 
19
**
EU
 P
ol
iti
cia
n
 
13
9.
82
 
34
.3
6
 
29
.4
5
 
2.
09
 
2
 
1.
64
 
48
.8
2
Na
tio
na
l P
ol
icy
-m
ak
er
 
11
1.
77
 
62
.2
3
 
41
 
2.
23
 
3.
85
 
3.
46
*
 
53
.7
7
EU
 P
ol
icy
-m
ak
er
 
15
1.
56
 
51
.6
3
 
30
.1
3
 
1.
5
 
4.
19
 
2.
94
 
70
.2
5*
Al
l C
en
tra
l E
ur
op
ea
n 
M
EP
s
 
13
5.
3
 
45
.8
6
 
31
.7
3
 
1.
73
 
3.
18
 
2.
52
 
55
.3
6
So
ur
ce
: O
wn
 ca
lcu
la
tio
ns
, o
rig
in
al
 d
at
a 
fro
m
 Vo
te
wa
tc
h.
eu
.
Si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e l
ev
el
s:
 *s
ig
. <
 0.
1, 
**
si
g.
 < 0
.0
5.
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 26.04.16 11:19
Central European MEPs and Their Roles      21
Policy-makers expand to all genres to at least an average degree, Politicians can 
only say this about politics-type tasks. On average, National Politicians and EU 
Politicians tend to deliver more speeches in plenary sessions than National Pol-
icy-makers, and, in this regard, they are not that far behind EU Policy-makers, the 
most active group. Other than this, National Politicians do not reach the average 
in any other forms of activity, which shows an overall passivity towards policy, 
and a distance from political genres which are somewhat more difficult to media-
tize. In all of their activities, EU Politicians outdo National Politicians. When com-
pared with National Politicians, they use parliamentary questions, motions for 
resolutions and written statements more, and they are not as passive in the field 
of policy as their nationally focused peers.
Based on the data, it can be stated that role orientations are detectable in MEPs 
behavior within the European Parliament. MEPs with a politics focus show average 
political activity, but they undertake much less policy work – they resolutely keep 
away from policy dossiers. Policy-makers use political tools to an average degree, 
but they are extraordinary in spending their energy on policy genres.
6.2   The Roles of Central European MEPs and their Activities 
Outside of the EP
The work of MEPs cannot be understood in its totality without analyzing activity 
outside of the institution. Because of the intra-institutional focus of most aca-
demic studies we have a large amount of knowledge about what happens in the 
European Parliament, but we know very little about how MEPs cultivate relation-
ships with the outside world – the public lives of their own countries, the press 
and other EU bodies. This direction for examination is also relevant because MEPs’ 
extra-parliamentary activity is institutionalized by the so-called green week, an 
initiative which assigns a week each month for work within the constituency. The 
survey research conducted with Central European MEPs included some questions 
which are suitable for drawing a few conclusions about the extra-parliamentary 
dimension of role perceptions. When discussing the research results, it is useful 
to distinguish between networks outside of politics and the strength of relation-
ships with political actors who are not in the EP.
Table 9 shows the frequency of Central European MEPs’ relationships, accord-
ing to their own admissions, with non-political actors broken down by role types. 
All four analyzed categories show below-average intensity for EU Politicians. This 
coincides with the usual passivity experienced by generalist Politicians, while 
the European focus seems to weaken the motivation for prioritizing relationships 
with journalists and citizens.
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Three of the four National Politicians meet with voters each week, and the 
fourth also confesses to monthly contact at minimum. However, it was conspicu-
ous that two out of the four are completely passive when it came to keeping in 
touch with non-politicians, while the other two meet with journalists at least on a 
weekly basis and with interest groups monthly. None of them meet with lobbyists 
at least monthly.
Analyzing the frequency of non-EP relationships also proves that EU Pol-
icy-makers are active in all areas, and that extra-parliamentary interest groups 
and lobbyists know that they are the ones to be targeted for achieving tangible 
results. Two-thirds of EU Policy-makers meet with lobbyists and organized pres-
sure groups at least on a monthly basis, which is the highest rate among all role 
types. In addition to this, they do not neglect relationships with journalists and 
citizens either. Seventy percent of EU Policy-makers meet with their constituents 
each week, and half of them welcome journalists with similar commonness. On a 
monthly basis, all politicians in this category meet with electors, and almost eve-
ryone gives interviews to the press frequently. Thus EU Policy-makers really can 
be viewed as political actors who are active in all fields. They are not only familiar 
with the EP’s policy processes, but their activity is generally extraordinary.
Table 9: Frequency of Central European MEPs’ Relationships with Non-Political Actors Outside 
of the EP According to Role Types (n = 45, percentage).
  National 
Politician
  EU 
Politician
  National 
Policy-maker
  EU 
Policy-maker
  All Central 
European MEPs
Individual citizens
 At least weekly   75   36.4*   61.5   70.6   60
 At least monthly   25   36.4**   30.8   29.4   31.1
Organized interest groups
 At least weekly   0   18.2   30.8   17.6   20
 At least monthly   50   27.3   38.5   52.9   42.2
Lobbyists
 At least weekly   0   18.2   15.4   23.5   17.8
 At least monthly   0**   9.1   38.5   41.2**   28.9
Journalists
 At least weekly   50   36.4   23.1   52.9   40
 At least monthly   0   27.3   69.2   35.3   40
Source: Own research, EPRG 2010.
Original question: How frequently are you in contact with the following groups, people, or 
institutions?
Significance levels: *sig. < 0.1, **sig. < 0.05.
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The frequency of National Policy-makers’ relationships with non-political 
actors is average or extraordinary in all areas. Notably, almost all of them give 
interviews to the press at least monthly, though there are much fewer politicians 
among them who meet journalists weekly than among EU Policy-makers. Half 
of National Policy-makers meet with lobbyists monthly, two-thirds of them with 
organized interest groups, and almost all with constituents. Generally speak-
ing they are more active in cultivating non-political relationships outside of the 
institution than MEPs with a politics focus, but their activity levels lag somewhat 
behind that of EU Policy-makers. The real differences – as it was visible with 
behavior inside the EP – are not along the national/European axis, but along the 
policy/politics divide. One of the best examples for this is the frequency of rela-
tionships nurtured with lobbyists. While EU Politicians and National Politicians 
rarely give accounts of such meetings, these are wide-spread among National 
Policy-makers and EU Policy-makers.
It is also interesting to look at what ties exist between Central European 
MEPs and non-EP political actors (Table 10). Among the questions, there were 
elements prodding both national and European politics. The results reinforce 
previously visible trends. National Politicians are characterized by general pas-
sivity when it comes to EU political actors, and even in connection with other 
MEPs from their own countries. All of them stay in contact with MPs of their 
own countries, however, and they meet with the members of their national gov-
ernments and party leaderships. In theory, EU Politicians could treat nurturing 
relationships with the leaderships of their parliamentary factions as an abso-
lute priority. Nonetheless, in the case of Central European MEPs, this is not so. 
When compared with National Policy-makers and EU Policy-makers, they are 
less active is in this field as well: less than two-thirds of EU Politicians keep in 
touch with the leaders of their parliamentary groups, while the same indicator 
for Policy-makers is 90%. EU Politicians do not have substantial relationships 
with the European Commission either, including both Commissioners and offi-
cials. In their case, the European focus means a weaker link with their national 
political elites. The strength of their ties to the leaders of their national parties 
and MPs is below average, and it is particularly week with members of their 
national governments.
The relationships of the two groups of Policy-makers have comparable for-
titude in many respects except when it comes to the European Commission, to 
which EU Policy-makers have stronger ties. A National Policy-maker focus does 
not mean a stronger connection with domestic politics. The cause for this, once 
again, might be that the European activities of EU Policy-makers are not executed 
to the detriment of other relationships; they also take care to build strong national 
links necessary for re-election.
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When it comes to the European Commission, according to the responses of 
Central European MEPs, National Policy-makers also seek out their colleagues 
in the executive and Commissioners when their cause, typically of national rel-
evance, mandates this. For EU Policy-makers, it is essential to maintain close 
contact with the European Commission. Two-thirds of EU Policy-makers have the 
networks for monthly audiences with European Commissioners, which, when 
compared to other role types, is exceptional.
It can be concluded that most Central European MEPs do keep an eye on the 
actors of national politics and nurture a close relationship with them. A slight 
Table 10: Frequency of Central European MEPs’ Relationships with Political Actors Outside of 
the EP According to Role Types (n = 45, percentage).
National 
Politician
EU 
Politician
National 
Policy-maker
EU 
Policy-maker
All Central 
European MEPs
Leaders of my European political group
 At least weekly 25 18.2 30.8 47.1* 33.3
 At least monthly 0** 45.5 61.5 41.2 44.4
MEPs of other parties from my member state
 At least weekly 0 54.5 15.4* 52.9 37.8
 At least monthly 25** 27.3 76.9 29.4 42.2
Officials in the European Commission
 At least weekly 0 0 0 35.3*** 13.3
 At least monthly 0** 0*** 76.9* 58.8*** 44.4
European Commissioners
 At least weekly 0 0 0 0 0
 At least monthly 0* 9.1** 46.2 64.7** 40
Members of my national political party
 At least weekly 75 18.2** 61.5 52.9 48.9
 At least monthly 0 81.8 30.8 41.2 44.4
Members of my national party executive
 At least weekly 0 18.2 30.8 23.5 22.2
 At least monthly 75 54.5 53.8 70.6 62.2
MPs from my national parliament
 At least weekly 50 9.1 23.1 23.5 22.2
 At least monthly 50 36.4** 46.2 58.8 48.9
Ministers from my national government
 At least weekly 0 9.1 7.7 0 4.4
 At least monthly 75 18.2 46.2 41.2 40
Source: Own research, EPRG 2010.
Original question: How frequently are you in contact with the following groups, people, or 
institutions?
Significance levels: *sig. < 0.1, **sig. < 0.05, ***sig. < 0.01.
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exception to this is the group of EU Politicians, but they also often speak to 
national party leaders, who are key to re-election. The general difference between 
the activities of Policy-makers and Politicians is also observable in the field of 
non-EP relationships. This is very discernible in terms of attention paid to the 
European Commission, but it can also be traced in relation to the strength of rela-
tionships maintained with journalists, lobbyists and interest groups.
7  Conclusion
To identify the role orientations of Central European MEPs, in line with the stand-
ards of neo-institutionalist elite research, I used the attitudes of politicians as 
a starting point. The described role types are not subjective constructions but 
coherent attitudinal structures based on quantitative research utilizing the 
analysis of responses provided by MEPs. The results of the survey reinforced the 
hypothesis that both the policy/politics and European/national axes are suitable 
for classifying Central European MEPs (H1). Due to the special institutional posi-
tion of the EP and its internal functioning, these two dimensions cover a dilemma 
which exists in the lives of all MEPs. They necessitate a strategic response to the 
problem of what an MEP should spend the scarce resources of time and energy 
on in terms of representation. Through the poles of these two axes, four types 
of ideals become visible. Consequently, the four possible role types are National 
Politicians, EU Politicians, National Policy-makers and EU Policy-makers.
Multivariate analyses confirmed that socio-demographic factors, attitudes 
and political socialization all influence the role orientations of MEPs. The institu-
tional framework and personal preferences both proved to be important, and this 
strengthened the practical relevance of the neo-institutionalist theoretical frame-
work. Time spent in the EP, age, the nature of previous political experience, party 
affiliation, left-right self-definition and future career ambitions are parameters 
which allow for a fairly accurate assessment of a politician’s role orientation. One 
important research result is that the policy/politics and European/national axes 
have different roots; they are explained by different variables. In the former, the 
most important determining factors are previous political experience and career 
ambitions. In the latter, the most precise indicators of a politician’s position are 
age, political group and left-right self-definition. The only factor which aids the 
forecasting of an MEP’s role orientation in both dimensions is time spent in the 
EP, otherwise known as the incumbency factor.
Activity trends inside and outside of the EP demonstrate that the dimensions 
used to demarcate role orientations are detectable in the behavior of Central 
Bereitgestellt von | De Gruyter / TCS
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 26.04.16 11:19
26      András Bíró-Nagy
European MEPs. The differences between politics and policy orientations are 
visible in officially documented parliamentary genres (H2). As rapporteurs, in 
the preparation of opinions, and in submitting amendments, individuals with a 
policy profile are considerably more active than Politician MEPs. Those with more 
of a generalist and politics-oriented profile favor plenary speeches, but EU Politi-
cians are active in submitting questions to other EU institutions as well. The fact 
that Policy-makers show signs of above average activity in policy genres does not 
mean that they shy away from more political tools (plenary speeches, motions for 
resolutions, parliamentary questions and written statements). EU Policy-makers 
are the most omnivorous representatives. In addition to doing the most amount of 
work, their political activity does not lag behind their politics-profiled peers. As 
such, this shows a universal hyperactivity on the part of EU Policy-makers which 
consists of average political and above average policy work. Those with a Politi-
cian profile tend to generally be more passive than their Policy-maker colleagues. 
They keep a strict distance from policy, but they obviously favor political tools.
Within the EP, the fracture is clear between policy and politics, as expected. 
When looking at the frequency of activities outside of the EP, however, the differ-
ence between European and national foci is verified only partially (H3). The main 
reason for this is the above-mentioned versatility of EU Policy-makers. Not only 
do they create strong networks within the European institutional framework, but 
they also pay attention to nurture ties with national public life. The hypothesis 
which follows from the European/national focus, according to which nationally-
oriented representatives formulate closer ties with their country’s public life, 
is fulfilled only partially. When viewed against EU Politicians the difference is 
indeed visible, and it favors National Politicians and National Policy-makers. 
In other words, the hypothesis applies to National MEPs, but out of those with 
European profiles it only applies to politics-focused individuals. In the case of 
the latter, the European orientation weakens motivation to keep in touch with 
constituents and the press back home. While a policy/politics orientation is very 
much identifiable in terms of intra-EP activity, the European/national focus is 
less apparent in work outside of the EP, thanks to the hyperactivity of European 
Policy-makers.
In the field of activities outside of the EP, the significance of the policy/poli-
tics axis is detectable, too. It is almost exclusively true that only MEPs open to 
policy-making seek contact with the European Commission, and it is them who 
lobbyists and other interest groups try to connect with. Those with the profile of 
a National Politician and EU Politician have almost no contact with these actors. 
This is understandable, since the European Commission has a strong policy-mak-
ing character, and also because lobbyists know that public policy dossiers are 
affected best through Policy-makers.
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The political roles sketched out in this study form coherent attitudinal and 
behavioral structures, but this does not mean that MEPs cannot be open to mul-
tiple directions. As it is true for the literature on political roles in general, in this 
case, too, the roles are not exclusive. Instead, it is much more adequate to speak 
of dominant roles. Clear-cut roles are rare, the categories outlined in this paper 
are rather useful to show the most characteristic faces of Central European MEPs. 
Through the example of legislators from the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia, it was possible to get closer to understand what motivates 
MEPs and how adopted roles correlate with their everyday legislative activities.
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